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Abstract
It is a common metaphor that the text is a window onto the world that it depicts. In 
legal interpretation, the metaphor has been developed in two ways – the legal text as 
transparent or opaque – and the Article proposes a third – the legal text as translucent. 
The claim that the legal text is transparent has been associated with more liberal meth-
odological approaches. According to this view (often articulated by critics), the legal 
text does not markedly delimit meaning. Delimitation comes from the interpreters. By 
contrast, stress on the opacity of the legal text comes from those who give priority 
to the text rather than to any separable purpose lying behind the text. The Article’s 
emphasis on the legal text as translucent builds on the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur 
and emphasizes the interrelation of text and context. To comprehend a legal text by 
reference to its context is to appreciate the light that the context brings to the text and 
renders the thickness and color of the text no longer opaque but translucent. The text 
is translucent to its context. The context is not outside the text but part of it. Attention 
to the text without regard for its external context may distort its meaning. The Article 
exempliﬁ es this perspective by drawing on recent legal scholarship and applies it brieﬂ y 
to a decision by the United States Supreme Court. The Article frames the attention to 
the legal text by referencing the debate over the text as transparent, opaque, or trans-
lucent in literary and philosophic interpretation.
Key words: legal interpretation, hermeneutics, Ricoeur, transparent, opaque and 
translucent.
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2 As I shall discuss, see infra text accompanying note 8, my attention to this tripartite division pre-existed my reading of White, who does not return to this speciﬁ c divi-
sion in his text. In my research on the topic over time, it has been of interest to see the tripartite division arise in other scholarly contexts: distinguishing the disposition 
of individuals to others as potentially transparent, translucent, or opaque (Gauthier, 1986, p. 173-174); distinguishing the characterization of the state as transparent, 
translucent, or opaque in the context of international human rights (D’Amato, 1989, p. 7); considering the law’s relation to moral considerations as transparent, trans-
lucent, or opaque (Powers, 1979, p. 1263-65; 1976, p. 28-29).
The reader is brought to the edge of the language that 
is being used, to the edge of language itself perhaps, 
where he can begin to see it as made, as chosen, as the 
material with which the mind can work. Language loses 
the transparency it normally has and becomes opaque, 
or perhaps better, translucent (White, 2001, p. 3).
Introduction
It is a common metaphor that the text is a win-
dow onto the world that it depicts. I want to explore 
this metaphor and the insights it may offer us for better 
understanding legal interpretation. As in the opening epi-
graph from James Boyd White, I shall develop the meta-
phor of the text as window in three ways: the text may 
be transparent, opaque, or translucent.2 My goal will be 
to argue that the best way to understand legal interpre-
tation is to conceive of the legal text as translucent, but 
along the way I will compare the merits also of conside-
ring the legal text as either transparent or opaque.
Transparent
Let me begin by situating development of these 
three alternatives within the law by contextualizing the de-
bate at the larger level of literary and philosophic interpre-
tation. The metaphor of a text as transparent suggests that 
the text is a medium that provides a direct opening onto the 
world, an opening where the medium does not obtrude. In 
Henry David Thoreau’s Walden (Thoreau, 1960 [1854]), for 
example, he frequently refers to the transparency of Wal-
den Pond (Thoreau, 1960 [1854], p. 123, 131, 138); it is the 
“earth’s eye” (Thoreau, 1960 [1854], p. 128) and provides 
access to nature’s depths (Thoreau, 1960 [1854], p. 123). The 
pond’s transparency becomes the symbol for Thoreau’s own 
writerly task. We must, says Thoreau, “work and wedge our 
feet downward through the mud and slush of opinion, and 
prejudice, and tradition, and delusion and appearance... till 
we come to a hard bottom and rocks in place, which we 
can call reality, and say, This is, and no mistake...” (Thoreau, 
1960 [1854], p. 67). Thoreau urges us not to forget “the lan-
Resumo
É uma metáfora comum dizer o texto é uma janela para o mundo que retrata. Na 
interpretação legal, a metáfora tem sido desenvolvida de duas formas: o texto legal 
como transparente ou opaco – e o artigo propõe um terceiro - o texto legal como 
translúcido. A alegação de que o texto legal é transparente tem sido associada com 
abordagens metodológicas liberais. De acordo com este ponto de vista (muitas 
vezes discutida pelos críticos), o texto legal não delimita claramente o signiﬁ cado. 
A delimitação vem dos intérpretes. Por outro lado, a ênfase sobre a opacidade do 
texto legal vem daqueles que dão prioridade ao texto ao invés de outra ﬁ nalidade 
destacada além do texto. A ênfase do artigo sobre o texto legal como translúcido 
é baseado na hermenêutica de Paul Ricoeur e enfatiza a inter-relação do texto e 
contexto. Compreender um texto legal pela referência ao seu contexto é valorizar 
a luz que o contexto traz para o texto e transforma a espessura e cor do texto 
de opaca para translúcida. O texto é translúcido ao seu contexto. O contexto 
não está fora do texto, mas parte dele. Atenção ao texto sem levar em conta 
seu contexto externo pode distorcer o seu signiﬁ cado. O artigo exempliﬁ ca esta 
perspectiva, baseado em bolsas de estudos jurídicos recentes e aplicando-a a uma 
decisão do Supremo Tribunal dos Estados Unidos. O artigo foca o texto legal, 
fazendo referência ao debate sobre o texto o transparente, opaco ou translúcido 
na interpretação literária e ﬁ losóﬁ ca.
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guage which all things and events speak without metaphor...” 
(Thoreau, 1960 [1854], p. 77).3 This transparent language of 
nature is the language Thoreau’s work itself seeks,4 even if 
metaphors such as the pond remain for him a vehicle to that 
end (White, 2001, p. 18).
We ﬁ nd a similar emphasis in George Orwell’s 
work on the desired transparency of language, if not 
to the same transcendentalist end as Thoreau’s work. 
Orwell too wants language not to get in the way of 
depiction. Language should not itself be the object of 
consideration but should direct attention clearly to the 
reality written about. In Orwell’s famous phrase, “[g]ood 
prose is like a window pane” (Orwell, 1954, p. 320)5.
Opaque
In philosophy, Richard Rorty writes critically that 
the modern period since Descartes has viewed know-
ledge to have the task of providing an accurate “Mirror 
of Nature” (Rorty, 1979, p. 163). Our assumed challenge 
has been “to mirror accurately, in our own Glassy Es-
sence, the universe around us...” (Rorty, 1979, p. 357). 
Knowledge is the “assemblage of accurate representa-
tions” (Rorty, 1979, p. 163). The notions of the mind as a 
“Mirror” and of humanity’s “Glassy Essence” are meta-
phors of transparency. There is no obstruction between 
humanity and external reality, between mind and nature. 
In contrast, Rorty argues against the availability of 
transparency and claims that truth is a matter of social justi-
ﬁ cation (Rorty, 1979, p. 170). For him, the view of the mind as 
a mirror of nature should be discarded (Rorty, 1979, p. 170). 
The supposed window between the mind and any external 
reality or truth is opaque. Rorty argues for truth without 
mirrors (Rorty, 1979, p. 295). Humans successfully represent 
not according to nature’s conventions but to our own (Ror-
ty, 1979, p. 298). Rorty draws upon philosophers John Dewey, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Martin Heidegger as exemplars 
of a contemporary approach whereby “words take their 
meanings from other words rather than by virtue of their 
representative character” and vocabularies gain their merit 
by virtue of those who use them “rather than from their 
transparency to the real” (Rorty, 1979, p. 368).
The commonality in perspective that Rorty ﬁ nds 
can be extended across diverse terrains of contempora-
ry continental and Anglo-American approaches. In work 
typiﬁ ed by Wittgenstein, Anglo-American philosophy has 
turned from questions of metaphysics to the philosophy 
of language. For Wittgenstein, as is well known, meaning is 
not a matter of mirroring nature but of its use in human 
language games (Wittgenstein, 1958). Continental thought 
is exempliﬁ ed in Ferdinand de Saussure’s claim that meaning 
depicts not some claimed external reality but is explicated 
by the differentiation of signs through their relation to other 
signs in the linguistic system. “[I]n language[,]” says Saussure, 
“there are only differences without positive terms... [L]an-
guage has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the 
linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differen-
ces that have issued from the system” (De Saussure, 1959). 
Jacques Derrida’s theory of deconstruction is an extension 
of Saussure’s insight that we are caught within the world 
of signs. In Derrida’s well-known phrase, “[t]here is nothing 
outside of the text” (Derrida, 1976, p. 158). Maurice Merle-
au-Ponty captures these perspectives in writing precisely of 
the “opaqueness of language. Nowhere does it stop and lea-
ve a place for pure meaning; it is always limited only by more 
language, and meaning appears within it only set in a context 
of words” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 42).6 Merleau-Ponty no-
tes language’s “opaqueness, its obstinate reference to itself, 
and its turning and folding back upon itself...” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964, p. 43). According to these vantage points, the window 
of the text is opaque because it provides no view to anything 
outside; its world is internal and self-referential.7 
3  James Boyd White refers to this passage, too, although his focus is not that of transparency (White, 2001, p. 17-18).
4  Thoreau’s emphases here have become a model for environmental writing. See, e.g., Slovic (1992). Thoreau’s attempt to move to transparency beyond the “mud and 
slush” of language evokes as well provocative comparisons with the goals of some Asian religions (Versluis, 1993).
5  For application of Orwell to legal writing, see Samuelson (1984) (emphasizing the needed clarity of argument).
6  Earlier in this passage Merleau-Ponty seems to allude to the traditional metaphor of the linguistic sign as a window. He states that the usual view is that meaning is “immanent” 
to signs “in the sense that each one of them, having its meaning once and for all, could not conceivably slip any opacity between itself and us...” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 42).
7  I would claim that, for at least Derrida, the text is in fact translucent rather than opaque, despite the perhaps more stereotypical view that he would emphasize the latter (Derrida, 
1976). When Derrida claims that reading cannot “transgress” the text toward some external reality “whose content could take place, could have taken place outside of language” 
(Derrida, 1976, p. 158), it may be that while “external reality” cannot appear outside of language, it can through language. The insight of Derrida–and also of Paul Ricoeur, to whom 
I shortly turn–is that so much can appear in language. Nevertheless, the statement that there is nothing outside the text remains indicative of a perspective insisting that the text is 
opaque and not translucent. Let me offer just one additional gloss on Derrida’s perspective on the translucent. Although without reference to Rorty, Derrida agrees with Rorty that 
the usual understanding of reﬂ ection is that it is a process of transparent mirroring. Derrida wants to problematize the nature of this reﬂ ection. He writes of “the specular nature of 
philosophical reﬂ ection, philosophy being incapable of inscribing (comprehending) what is outside it otherwise than through the appropriating assimilation of a negative image of it, 
and dissemination is written on the back–the tain–of that mirror” (Derrida, 1981, p. 33). In an extremely accomplished analysis, Rodolphe Gasché builds a work that orients its un-
derstanding of Derrida through this imagery (Gasché, 1986). To attend the tain of the mirror is to attend the structure that generates the mirror’s reﬂ ection. We think of the mirror’s 
reﬂ ection as transparent, yet since the tain “is made of disseminated structural instances, the mirror’s tinfoil necessarily becomes semitransparent and, as a correlate, only semireﬂ ec-
tive. Reﬂ ection, then, appears to be affected by the infrastructures that make it possible; it appears broached and breached as an inevitably imperfect and limited Scheinen [shining]” 
(Gasché, 1986, p. 238). Gasché goes on to describe the tain as “opaque” (Gasché, 1986, p. 238). I would describe the “semitransparent” and “semireﬂ ective” activity as translucent.
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8  Tillich claims in this section that it is the idea of translucency that he has always had in mind on this matter, mistaking the implications in English of the word “trans-
parency” in some of his earlier work. For the signiﬁ cance of such usage in Tillich’s work, see (i) Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology 121, 124, 133 (1967) (transparency), (ii) 
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology 122, 151 (1967), and (iii) Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology 99 (1967) (translucency). 
9  “In forming a name, we have both disclosure of Being and enclosure in the ﬁ nitude of language... By preserving, man contains, does violence, and also begins to conceal” 
(Ricoeur, 1974, p. 233).
10  We do ﬁ nd in Ricoeur language about the transparent and the opaque. He claims, for instance, that the symbol is opaque and not transparent because it is “endowed 
with concrete roots and a certain material density and opacity” (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 317).
11  Reﬂ ective philosophy asserts that the self is known not in immediacy but as “‘mediated’ by representations, actions, works, institutions, and monuments which ob-
jectify it” (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 327).
12  Chapter on “Market-Inalienability” arguing that certain qualities of personhood should be inalienable in the economic market and therefore not commodiﬁ ed (Radin, 
1996, p. 16-29).
13  For a more extended response to Radin, see Taylor and Madison (2006).
Translucent
Translucency in turn mediates between transpa-
rency and opacity. Like opacity, translucency acknowled-
ges the materiality of the medium of communication; 
like transparency, some light does come through the 
medium, even if colored by the medium’s thickness and 
hues. My ﬁ rst encounter with the term translucency 
came in the work of theologian Paul Tillich. Tillich found 
the term useful to describe that 
which does not allow that things are clearly seen 
through it (e.g., stained window). The light shines 
through the stained window, but the window contri-
butes something, the manifoldness, diverse intensity, 
and interrelation of colors. [...] The color and forms 
are the contributions of the medium which make a 
seeing of the invisible possible (Tillich, 1966, p. 46).8
The imagery of stained glass is useful. What I re-
tain about the notion of translucency is that the light–
the message, the meaning–appears only by virtue of its 
transmission through the stained glass. We do not have 
independent, direct, unmediated access to it in some 
way. We need the window in order to see. At the same 
time, the virtue of the stained glass lies not in itself but 
in what it conveys, which is a product of both the light as 
well as the colors and thickness of the glass. The stained 
glass is not complete in itself. Further, it is also essential 
to recognize that the stained glass ﬁ lters; it contributes 
its color to the message transmitted. Translucency dis-
closes but also distorts (Ricoeur, 1974, p. 233).9 I shall 
later explore how a legal text is similarly translucent–it 
too discloses and distorts–and shall consider the impli-
cations of this characterization for legal interpretation.
Because my discussion of legal interpretation will 
be framed by the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, I want to 
complete my discussion of the larger themes of transpa-
rency, translucency, and opacity by indicating the afﬁ nity 
of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics to notions of translucency, 
even though, to my knowledge, he does not directly at-
tend that term.10 Ricoeur, a French philosopher, shared 
an intellectual environment similar to Merleau-Ponty 
and Derrida (Dosse, 2008, p. 135-38, 359-363) and was 
also inﬂ uenced by the work of Saussure (Ricoeur, 1974, 
p. 27-61) and reﬂ ective philosophy.11 Ricoeur’s herme-
neutics is predicated upon the claim that we understand 
the self, others, actions, or history not by intuition but 
through the signs they display (Ricoeur, 1975a, p. 34-35). 
These signs are objectiﬁ cations–exterior marks–of me-
aning. They are not transparent and so unmediated; their 
quality as signs or marks brings some dimension, some 
opacity to them. But the light they transmit comes from 
elsewhere, from the “creative energies” of human life 
(Ricoeur, 1991, p. 112). 
Several aspects of Ricoeur’s portrayal are worth 
noting. First, the externalization and objectiﬁ cation of 
human meaning, human energies, is inevitable (Ricoeur, 
1974, p. 27) whether this occurs in discourse, written 
texts, action, craft, art, or institutions. Human meaning 
must take on some kind of expression, some kind of 
form. Second, objectiﬁ cation can be positive, as the arts 
may most readily illustrate. This view contrasts with 
those such as legal scholar Margaret Jane Radin who 
argues that objectiﬁ cation necessarily entails commodi-
ﬁ cation, the alienation of human meaning from the pro-
duct (Radin, 1996, p. 16-29).12 For Radin, objectiﬁ cation 
is the negation of the human subject; it is the “failure to 
respect in theory and to make space in practice for the 
human subject” (Radin, 1996, p. 155).13 Ricoeur’s asses-
sment that objectiﬁ cation may be positive also marks a 
signal departure of his hermeneutics from the work of 
hermeneutic scholar Hans-Georg Gadamer and social 
theorist Charles Taylor. 
Gadamer views objectiﬁ cation as necessarily 
alienating, and he critiques the method of the human 
sciences as alienating because it is objectifying (Ricoeur, 
1981, p. 60). As for Taylor, his assessment is that not 
only is the Western trend to treat the external world 
as devoid of inherent meaning and as simply composed 
of objects–an “‘objectiﬁ cation’ of the world”–but that 
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this objectiﬁ cation has extended “to englobe human life 
and society” (Taylor, 1975, p. 539). Social relations and 
practices have themselves become objectiﬁ ed (Taylor, 
1975, p. 540), and the result is a utilitarian, mechanistic 
science of human being (Taylor, 1975, p. 539). In contrast, 
for Ricoeur we must distinguish between the positive 
exteriorization of meaning into signs, texts, objects, or 
goods—forms of objectiﬁ cation—and the negative ex-
teriorization which leads to the separation of human 
meaning from the object—forms of alienation or reiﬁ -
cation (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 32).14
As already lightly anticipated, the third impli-
cation of Ricoeur’s depiction of objectiﬁ cation is that 
objectiﬁ cation occurs not only in written texts but in 
many other forms of human activity, such as labor, craft, 
the arts, and history. Further, these objectiﬁ cations make 
these activities texts. Human action is textual in its ob-
jectiﬁ cation or exteriorization, similar to the ﬁ xation 
that occurs in writing (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 138, 150).15 The 
meaning of these activities is derived on the basis of in-
terpretation of their objectiﬁ cation in exterior marks.16
Fourth, we must be careful to address the full 
capacities for meaning that may inhere in texts. Two sub-
points are pertinent here. First, the quality of meaning 
may be robust and creative. Textual meaning may mani-
fest something new, innovative, inspired. In Ricoeur’s cor-
pus the full extensions of this insight come particularly 
to light in his work on metaphor. For Ricoeur, creative 
metaphor can shatter not only the existing structures 
of language but also the previous structures of reality 
(Ricoeur, 1978, p. 132).17 He writes of the potential for 
the “eruption of the unheard in our discourse” (Ricoeur, 
1975, p. 127). The example of poetry may be the rea-
diest example of the possibility of the new occurring in 
language.18 Contrary to the views of Saussure (Ricoeur, 
1974) or of  Rorty (1979), we may not be caught within 
the existing world of signs. As already discussed, Ricoeur 
believes not that we can escape the world of texts–of 
exteriorization and objectiﬁ cation of meaning–but that 
more may be available within language, within texts, than 
we may have contemplated.19
A corollary subpoint is that interpretation of any 
of these texts requires us to be open to the potential 
world of meaning that a text expresses. If the examina-
tion of a text undertakes interpretation of meaning—in 
contrast to other reductive methodologies in psycholo-
gy, sociology, or other social or life sciences—the task 
is one of recognizing the text’s signs as objectiﬁ cations 
of meaning (if they are) rather than as reductive reiﬁ -
cations. Ricoeur writes of the needed effort of appro-
priation of the world that the text may convey (Ricoeur, 
1981, p. 182). In particular, Ricoeur emphasizes, inter-
pretation must allow the text the manifestation of new 
truths rather than reduce its message to or judge its 
message according to its adequation to existing norms 
(Ricoeur, 1995, p. 36).20
The ﬁ fth and ﬁ nal point about Ricoeur’s theory 
of the text as the objectiﬁ cation of meaning returns 
more directly to the theme of translucency. Because 
meaning is expressed in texts, in objectiﬁ ed signs, it is 
not transparent but conveyed by and mediated by these 
texts and signs. The text as window is not clear glass but 
translucent due to the color and thickness of its signs. 
The textual signs convey meaning, but they also color 
meaning. If I may analogize from elsewhere in Ricoeur’s 
writing, texts capture meaning but the coloring and thi-
ckness of their signs may also, perhaps inevitably, trans-
late meaning, giving it different hues and form than were 
sought.21 The objectiﬁ cation of meaning in texts disclo-
ses but also distorts.
The legal text as transparent, 
opaque, or translucent
I now turn from depiction of the larger themes 
of the transparency, opacity, and translucency of texts 
and examine their application within the more speci-
14  In this essay, Ricoeur equates alienation with reiﬁ cation (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 32). 
15  In this essay, Ricoeur brings the idea of action as objectiﬁ cation (1981, p. 150) and action as exteriorization (1981, p. 138).
16  The concept of culture of anthropologist Clifford Geertz is similarly semiotic (Geertz, 1973). Geertz explicitly analogizes the “thick description” of cultural meaning 
(Geertz, 1973, p. 7) to interpreting a literary text (Geertz, 1973, p. 448). “[C]ultural forms can be treated as texts, as imaginative works built out of social materials...” 
(Geertz, 1973, p. 449). Geertz makes plain that he borrows the idea of the inscription of action from Ricoeur (Geertz, 1973, p. 19).
17  For Ricoeur’s more complete treatment of metaphor see Ricoeur (1977). 
18  As in the immediately prior quotation, the potential theological – or, more generally, ontological – implications of this insight also need to be acknowledged.
19  For Rorty the proper philosophical task is ediﬁ cation (Rorty, 1979, p. 357-372). The situation is admittedly more complex in Rorty, as ediﬁ cation allows “for the sense 
of wonder which poets can sometimes cause–wonder that there is something new under the sun, something which is not an accurate representation of what was 
already there...” (Rorty, 1979, p. 370). What this openness to wonder means in Rorty’s world remains, indeed, opaque.
20  For elaboration of the distinction between manifestation and adequation in the context of analysis of Derrick Bell’s work, see Taylor (2007).
21  Ricoeur argues that understanding is translation (Ricoeur, 2006). His particular focus is on the lack of a common, identical language even between speakers of the 
ostensibly same language such as English. I extend the point to argue that the translation occurs not only between speaker and speaker (or writer and interpreter) 
but between speaker and utterance (Ricoeur, 2006, p. 25).
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ﬁ c context of legal interpretation. I want to argue for 
the propriety of interpreting legal texts as translucent 
but will present arguments in the legal literature for the 
other motifs. We shall also discover that application of 
these themes to legal interpretation requires their fur-
ther reﬁ nement to ﬁ t this domain. While in the present 
article I seek to comprehend how we may retain legal 
texts as (positive) objectiﬁ cations of legal meaning and 
not their (negative) reiﬁ cations, the horizon of this in-
quiry asks how the same may be said of the larger legal 
institutions that these texts represent.
The legal text as transparent
If less in the ascendancy currently, the claim that 
the legal text is transparent has been associated with more 
liberal methodological approaches. In the 1970s, Thomas 
Grey wrote of liberals who endorsed results of equal tre-
atment even though the constitutional text did not provide 
“the source of the values or principles that rule the cases;” 
instead, these liberals maintained that the text’s broad pro-
visions provided legitimacy “for judicial development and 
explication of basic shared national values” (Grey, 1975, p. 
97-98). In the early 1980s, Henry Monaghan accused liberal 
constitutional scholars of believing that the Constitution’s 
meaning was coextensive with their own personal social 
and political preferences (Monaghan, 1981). In the 1990s, 
Robin West argued, adopting reader-response theory 
(West, 1994), that the constitutional text does not itself 
operate as a signiﬁ cant interpretive constraint (West, 1994, 
p. 74), but constraint lies in the “purposes, needs, or inte-
rests of the relevant interpreting community” (West, 1994, 
p. 307). For these approaches, the legal text is transparent; 
it does not markedly delimit meaning. Delimitation comes 
from the interpreters.
A small group of legal scholars agrees with the 
methodological liberals that the legal text does not su-
pply constraint, but this group argues that interpretive 
determinacy can be located in the intentions of its au-
thors rather than in the text’s interpretive communities 
(its readers) (Alexander and Prakash, 2004).22 Oddly, 
Stanley Fish now locates himself within this camp (Fish, 
2008).23 Still, for these scholars too the text is transpa-
rent; it does not impose constraint. 
A modiﬁ ed form of textual transparency arises 
in the work of other commentators on the Constitu-
tion, both liberal and conservative. These writers in-
sist that certain grounding principles are contained in 
the Constitution and, in that sense, are not imposed 
upon it (Dworkin, 1996, p. 2). These principles provi-
de the text some interpretive density and hence lack 
of transparency that must be respected. And these 
writers typically state regard for the delimitations on 
interpretation imposed by the Constitution’s struc-
ture (Dworkin, 1996, p. 10-11). But the more general 
impression these writers leave is that once generally 
articulated, these principles leave considerable trans-
parency to the constitutional text. Interpretive boun-
daries are located more by reference to the princi-
ple than to the structure of the text itself. The text’s 
transparency is in part suggested by the divergence 
in principles (or their understanding) emphasized as 
available in the text by these commentators. Ronald 
Dworkin famously emphasizes the principle of subs-
tantive equality in the Constitution (Dworkin, 1996, p. 
270) and then goes on to argue that a “moral reading” 
of the text is required to interpret that principle’s con-
tours. Justice Clarence Thomas also lays stress on the 
principle of equality “that underlies and infuses our 
Constitution,”24 but, in contrast to Dworkin, he em-
phasizes a principle of formal equality that disallows a 
government’s racial classiﬁ cations. Richard Epstein in 
turn argues that a Lockean theory of private property 
was incorporated into the Constitution (Epstein, 1985, 
p. 16). Within the Constitution’s original framework, he 
maintains, “the rich array of procedural and jurisdictio-
nal protections was expected to serve some substanti-
ve end. And that end was, of course, the protection of 
private property...” (Epstein, 1985, p. 17).
The legal text as opaque
Stress on the opacity of the legal text comes from 
those who give priority to the text rather than any se-
parable purpose lying behind the text. Perhaps the most 
helpful account here comes from Frederick Schauer in 
his discussion of what it entails to follow a rule. Rule-
following asks decision makers to “treat the generaliza-
tion of a rule as entrenched,” and hence “as supplying 
reasons for decision independent of those supplied by 
the generalization’s underlying justiﬁ cation” (Schauer, 
22  For an earlier endorsement of a similar position, see Campos (1993). For classic legal emphasis on the author’s intentions, see Berger (1977) and Bork (1971).
23  Previously, Fish had been well known for advocating that meaning lies with the text’s readers.  See Fish (1980). 
24  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing the Declaration of Inde-
pendence as the source for this constitutional principle).
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1991, p. 51).25 We follow the rule, not its supposed un-
dergirding rationale. An alternative form of decision 
making, says Schauer, does the reverse: it emphasizes 
attention to the underlying justiﬁ cation rather than to 
the rule. “The existing generalization operates merely as 
the defeasible marker of a deeper reality. It is transparent 
rather than opaque, and a decision-maker operating in 
this mode is expected to look through that transparent 
generalization to something deeper...” (Schauer, 1991, p. 
51).26 I was, of course, intrigued to see Schauer charac-
terize rule-following as a method that regards the text 
as “opaque.”27 It was also intriguing to ascertain that 
Schauer analyzes the interpretive division to be twofold 
rather than threefold. Part of the present article’s inspi-
ration is to argue against Schauer for the availability of a 
third interpretive approach, where the text is properly 
regarded as translucent rather than either opaque or 
transparent.
The most prominent examples of legal interpre-
ters insisting on the opacity of the text are textualists 
such as Justice Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook. As is 
well known, Justice Scalia afﬁ rms that “[t]he text is the 
law, and it is the text that must be observed” (Scalia, 
1997, p. 22). He gives attention to the meaning of statu-
tory or constitutional words, not the separable inten-
tion of legislators or framers who drafted and passed 
the words (Schauer, 1987, p. 22-23). For Judge Easter-
brook, “Statutes are law, not evidence of law.”28 The text 
of the law is the rule rather than evidence of the “real” 
rule lying behind the text (Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1342).
Yet what I ﬁ nd particularly instructive about the 
stances of Justice Scalia and, even more so, Judge Eas-
terbrook is that each recognizes the role of context in 
determining the meaning of words in a legal text. I shall 
contend that this attention to context opens the way 
to my endorsement of a legal text’s translucency. I am 
less concerned here about the textualist attention to 
linguistic context29 than to external context that informs 
linguistic meaning. Again, as is well known, Justice Scalia 
is willing to look to the writings of the Constitution’s 
framers to reveal how that text was originally unders-
tood (Scalia, 1997, p. 38). Elsewhere Justice Scalia wri-
tes of an “unwritten Constitution” that “encompasses 
a whole history of meaning in the words contained in 
the Constitution, without which the Constitution itself 
is meaningless” (Scalia, 1989, p. 1). Judge Easterbrook is 
willing to look to legislative history (as Justice Scalia is 
not) (Scalia, 1997, p. 29-37) to help ascertain the mea-
ning of statutory language:
An unadorned “plain meaning” approach to interpre-
tation supposes that words have meanings divorced 
from their contexts – linguistic, structural, functional, 
social, historical. Language is a process of communica-
tion that works only when authors and readers share a 
set of rules and meanings... To decode words one must 
frequently reconstruct the legal and political culture 
of the drafters. Legislative history may be invaluable in 
revealing the setting of the enactment and the assump-
tions its authors entertained about how their words 
would be understood (Sinclair, 870 F.2d at 1342).
Schauer too acknowledges the role of context in 
ascertaining meaning: 
[C]ontextual factors are presupposed in attributing 
even the barest amount of meaning to an utterance. I 
understand what someone else says not simply because 
I understand the literal meaning of the words she uses, 
but also because I interpret those words in light of nu-
merous contextual understandings not contained in the 
deﬁ nitions of those words (Schauer, 1991, p. 56-57).30
If Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook argue 
that interpreters of legal texts must resurrect the 
original context of enacted language to establish the 
original meaning, Schauer’s recognition of context has 
a different implication. He claims that “a large number 
of contextual understandings will be assumed by all 
speakers of a language” (Schauer, 1991, p. 57). When 
contextual understandings are shared, frequently the 
result is “easy cases” (Schauer, 1985). As in Wittgens-
25  Schauer later draws an explicit comparison between positivism and rule-following (Schauer, 1991, p. 199) (“[A] positivist system is in many respects the systemic 
analogue of a rule”).
26  This quotation concludes with the point that the decision maker looks to something deeper “when recalcitrant experiences present themselves.” Otherwise, the rule 
and the underlying rationale coexist. In the text, I have deleted that conclusion to emphasize the difference between opacity and transparency. 
27  In other writings, Schauer asserts that the task of rule-following is to look at the text rather than behind or through it (Schauer, 1987, p. 46). At ﬁ rst glance, the diffe-
rentiation between looking at, behind, or through the text might suggest a tripartite division, such as I have been describing, between the text as opaque, transparent, 
or translucent. However, it is evident from the prior quotation, which reiterates the language of looking through, see supra text accompanying note 70, that looking 
behind or through the text are both modes where the text is transparent.
28  Matter of Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989).
29  For elaboration of textualism’s attention to linguistic context, see Taylor (1995).
30  As Schauer acknowledges (see Schauer 1991, at 57 n. 6), this insight has gained signiﬁ cant credibility in analytic philosophy. John Searle argues that traditional semantic 
theory, which contends that literal meaning is “context free,” is wrong (Searle, 1980, p. 223). “[F]or a large number of cases the notion of the literal meaning of a 
sentence only has application relative to a set of background assumptions, and... these background assumptions are not all and could not all be realized in the semantic 
structure of the sentence...” (Searle, 1979, p. 120).
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tein, shared contextual understandings do not require 
interpretation of a rule, for we already comprehend 
its meaning (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 201).31 One of the 
functions of legal education may be to promote sha-
red contextual understandings among those legally 
trained (Fiss, 1982, p. 746).32 Schauer concludes that 
these common understandings allow the “semantic 
autonomy of language,” its ability to be comprehen-
ded independent of the particular situation of use 
(Schauer, 1991, p. 55). For those, then, who interpret 
the legal text as opaque–as requiring attention to the 
text, not what may lie behind it–recognition is gran-
ted to the role of external context in determining 
textual meaning. However, this external context ge-
nerally leads to interpretive determinacy on the basis 
of either the text’s original meaning–its original con-
text–or its shared context with all informed readers.
The legal text as translucent 
As we turn to explore contemporary support 
and my own endorsement of the legal text as translu-
cent rather than as opaque or transparent, I want to 
retain the signiﬁ cance of external context in interpre-
tation and also, in a revised sense, the semantic auto-
nomy of the text. Although I do not argue the point 
here, it seems to me that communication is less ma-
rked by agreement or common understandings than 
by understandings that are at least somewhat off-
center from one another or reach greater commo-
nality only over a process of communication. I follow 
Ricoeur in viewing understanding, even among spe-
akers of the same language, as prototypically transla-
tion (Ricoeur, 2006, p. 24-25, 27-28).33 Whatever the 
merits of that larger contention, translation is also 
at issue in contested cases; there contexts are not 
shared between text and interpreters or between in-
terpreters. So a critical issue for legal interpretation 
is how to adjudge the external context of contested 
legal language.
The argument
Textualists such as Justice Scalia and Judge Eas-
terbrook typically want to delimit external context by 
resorting to the legal text’s original meaning. But that 
is not a necessary entailment of legal language. Judge 
Easterbrook allows, for instance, that some statutes are 
common law statutes that permit evolution of meaning 
as applied over time (Easterbrook, 1983, p. 544).34 And, 
of course, the Supreme Court has itself allowed for 
“evolving standards” in areas such as the jurispruden-
ce of capital punishment.35 The possibility of evolving 
meaning anticipates Ricoeur’s own conception of the 
semantic autonomy of language. No longer does this se-
mantic autonomy presuppose, as in Schauer, a common 
understanding of context between text and interpreter 
(Schauer, 1991, p. 55-57). Rather, Ricoeur describes the 
text’s autonomy in three respects: (i) from the author’s 
intention; (ii) from the cultural and sociological condi-
tions of the text’s production; and (iii) from its original 
audience (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 298). 
Due to its semantic autonomy, the text may 
open up possible meaning that escapes from its authors’ 
“ﬁ nite intentional horizon” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 83).36 Ri-
coeur has explicitly extended this analysis to law: “[T]
he meaning of a law, if it has one, is to be sought in 
the text and its intertextual connections, and not in the 
will of a legislator...” (Ricoeur, 2000, p. 112). For present 
purposes, the possibility of a legal text’s evolutionary 
meaning is a subordinate one, although it is an issue to 
which I return. I more want to pursue that this semantic 
autonomy is a consequence of the text’s density and 
structure. The text’s linguistic signs retain their vitality 
independent of any authorial plan that inspired them. 
The text’s signs are not transparent but have thickness. 
The issue now is to discern that this thickness is not 
opaque but translucent.
The claim is that more may be at work in a legal 
text than an emphasis on its opacity would allow. I ﬁ nd 
helpful here a trajectory of liberal interpretive metho-
31  “[T]here is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call ‘obeying the rule’ and ‘going against it’ in actual cases” (Wit-
tgenstein, 1958, paragraph 201).
32  “In law the interpretive community is a reality... There can be many schools of literary interpretation, but... in legal interpretation there is only one school and atten-
dance is mandatory” (Fiss, 1982, p. 746).
33  For development of this argument, see Taylor (2011).
34  “The statute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a good example, that effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law” (Easterbrook, 
1983, p. 44).
35  See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2649 (2008). The appropriate test, the Court held, was not “the standards that prevailed when the Eighth Amendment 
was adopted in 1791 but... the norms that ‘currently prevail’” (Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2649).
36  I am aware that one may be an advocate of original meaning and also allow that meaning may evolve. It may be, for instance, that an enacting legislature intentionally 
passed broad language to permit its evolution over time, as in a common law statute. The evolutionary meaning is then consistent with the original meaning.
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37  Given my attention to this vocabulary, it was of interest that Tribe describes a “self-contained constitutional text,” which he rejects, as “transparent” because it is 
“wholly visible” and “fully accessible,” absent of “arcane or hidden meanings” (Tribe, 2008, p. 149). In my terms, a self-contained text would be opaque because it is 
non-referential.
38  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39  Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
40  Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1165 (2009) (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2317, 2008; quoting Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 407, 1991).
41  It is uncertain to me that Tribe completely endorses this inextricable interconnection between text and context. In the sentence immediately prior to the language 
just quoted, Tribe indicates: “[t]o say that the invisible Constitution contains or implies rules that cannot be inferred from the visible text alone is emphatically not to 
say that the invisible Constitution bears no relation to the visible text” (Tribe, 2008, p. 38). This statement seems to allow for more separation of text and context 
than I would, although I appreciate the emphasis is on the contextual, “invisible” elements that inform the written text (Tribe, 2008, p. 38).
dology. We have seen that one side of that methodolo-
gy has maintained that the legal text is transparent and 
subject to constraint not due to its structure but to the 
community of its interpreters. A second strand has mo-
ved to greater recognition of the text’s weight. Thomas 
Grey, for example, changed his characterization of the li-
beral interpretive approach over time from an assertion 
that the constitutional text did not provide the source 
of principles that determined cases (Grey, 1975, p. 709) 
to a claim that liberals “accept supplementary sources 
of constitutional law” (Grey, 1984, p. 1), implying that 
the text had some interpretive heft after all. The written 
text was supplemented “with an unwritten constitution 
that is implicit in precedent, practice, and conventional 
morality” (Grey, 1984, p. 1). The unwritten constitution 
lay outside the text.
More recently the move is from the unwritten 
constitution to the “invisible Constitution,” in Lauren-
ce Tribe’s text of that name (Tribe, 2008). Tribe wants 
to insist “on the way the Constitution at every moment 
depends on extratextual sources of meaning” (Tribe, 
2008, p. 6). Signiﬁ cantly, for Tribe, the invisible Constitu-
tion entails meaning that goes “beyond mere personal 
preference” (Tribe, 2008, p. 36) and is instead “bounded” 
(Tribe, 2008, p. 35) and subject to “constraints” (Tribe, 
2008, p. 36). While the term “invisible” Constitution mi-
ght suggest transparency, Tribe analogizes to “dark mat-
ter” that exerts gravitational pull on the meaning of the 
constitutional text despite being unseen (Tribe, 2008, 
p. 38, 149). In my vocabulary, the dark matter informs 
the meaning of the constitutional text and so renders it 
translucent rather than transparent or opaque.37 Tribe 
writes of the Constitution’s unwritten extensions and 
implications (Tribe, 2008, p. 157), its “‘invisible’ struc-
ture and principles” (Tribe, 2008, p. 171), the unstated 
doctrines necessary to protect its explicit guarantees 
(Tribe, 2008, p. 172), its “underlying presuppositions and 
premises” (Tribe, 2008, p. 189). As Tribe recounts, these 
invisible principles have been invoked by both liberals 
and conservative courts. In New York Times v. Sullivan,38 
the Warren Court protected certain less essential spe-
ech–public interest advertising–in order not to chill po-
litical speech at the core of the First Amendment (Tribe, 
2008, p. 172-73). In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,39 
the Rehnquist Court protected Eleventh Amendment 
state sovereignty not on the basis of the Amendment’s 
explicit language but on the basis of its unwritten pre-
suppositions (Tribe, 2008, p. 54). Moving outside Tribe’s 
references, the Supreme Court has found a similar logic 
persuasive in statutory cases where it looks “not only 
to the particular statutory language, but to the design 
of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy.”40 
It remains debated in particular cases the range 
and extension to which external context can appropria-
tely be appealed, but for my purposes the point is to 
place emphasis on the interrelation of text and context. 
Tribe writes:
[M]ost of the modes of reasoning to the contents of 
the invisible Constitution involve arguing in one form 
or another from its visible text (but not in a way that 
could be considered “mere logical inference”). At the 
same time, the Constitution’s “dark matter” may be 
seen to animate and undergird signiﬁ cant portions of 
its visible text” (Tribe, 2008, p. 38).
Interpretation does not impose itself on a legal 
text that is transparent and has no weight and thick-
ness of its own. Nor does interpretation supplement 
the text from outside. Rather, the text manifests weight 
and thickness due to its language and the contextual 
presuppositions intertwined with this language.41 At the 
same time the text is not opaque and self-contained, 
because the context “animate[s]” the text. I ﬁ nd the 
most eloquent statement of the relation in law between 
text and context in the work of Charles Black, a sour-
ce of inspiration for Tribe’s own volume (Tribe, 2008, 
p. 147). Writing on the Constitution, Black claims that 
there is “a close and perpetual interworking between 
the textual and the relational and structural modes of 
reasoning, for the structure and relations concerned 
are themselves created by the text, and inference drawn 
from them must surely be controlled by the text” (Bla-
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ck, 1969, p. 31). As a matter of language in general and 
of legal language in particular, text and context are in-
terrelated. The text is translucent to its context. A more 
comprehensive understanding of what it means to have 
a text recognizes that the context is not outside the 
text but part of it. The context informs the text.
Before turning to interpretation of a statutory 
text to illustrate my argument about translucency, I offer 
one ﬁ nal extension of its logic. As witnessed in Justice 
Breyer’s recent book, Active Liberty (Breyer, 2005), much 
of the recent debate in legal interpretation divides be-
tween those, such as Justice Breyer himself, who give 
special prominence to the legal text’s purpose and tho-
se, such as Justice Scalia, who rest emphasis on the text’s 
language.42 What I found especially intriguing about Jus-
tice Breyer’s analysis, however, is the way he relates pur-
pose back to the text. Before judges divide as to points 
of emphasis, he writes, they employ similar tools. Note 
in his description the ties of these tools, including pur-
pose, to the text’s language:
[Judges] read the text’s language along with related 
language in other parts of the document. They take ac-
count of its history, including history that shows what 
the language likely meant to those who wrote it. They 
look to tradition indicating how the relevant language 
was, and is, used in the law. They examine precedents 
interpreting the phrase, holding or suggesting what 
the phrase means and how it has been applied. They 
try to understand the phrase’s purposes or (in res-
pect to many constitutional phrases) the values that it 
embodies, and they consider the likely consequences 
of the interpretive alternatives, valued in terms of the 
phrase’s purposes (Breyer, 2005, p. 7-8). 
Purpose is not isolable from the text but explica-
tive of it. Justice Breyer writes of how the approach he 
favors “sees texts as driven by purposes” (Breyer, 2005, 
p. 17). He does not look through a transparent text in 
order to focus on a purpose lying behind and indepen-
dent of or supplementary to the text. Instead, the pur-
pose is part of the context that informs the meaning of 
the text itself. While questions should appropriately be 
raised about what in the legislative history forms legiti-
mate sources of interpretation (Scalia, 1997, p. 29-37),43 
where it is legitimate the legislative history may rightly 
inform our understanding of the text’s purpose and cen-
tral meaning.
The argument applied
I conclude with examination of an exemplary 
case where the Supreme Court divided over statutory 
meaning and argue that understanding this meaning as 
translucent best comprehends what is at work in this 
text. I ﬁ nd more pertinent a dispute over statutory ra-
ther than constitutional meaning, because the structure 
of the text is more overtly at work in the statutory con-
text. Except for ﬁ gures such as Charles Black who em-
phasize analysis of constitutional structures (Black, 1969, 
p. 31), constitutional interpretation has more prototypi-
cally rested on engagement with constitutional phrases 
such as “equal protection,” and this, as we have seen, has 
allowed much interpretation in this arena to assume the 
constitutional text is transparent. The structure of the 
statutory text more prototypically exhibits the density 
and weight of the legal text.
The case I have chosen to explore is Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams,44 a Supreme Court decision from 
2001. The case is a favorite of mine in a course I teach 
on Legislation—whose subject matter includes statu-
tory interpretation along with the legislative process—
and it is of interest that Justice Breyer also ﬁ nds the case 
worthy of discussion in his book (Breyer, 2005, p. 91-95, 
147).45 In Circuit City, the Court had to assess the appli-
cation of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 
2006) (FAA) to an employment contract. The contract 
provided that all disputes had to be resolved exclusively 
by binding arbitration, and when employee Adams brou-
ght an employment discrimination suit against Circuit 
City two years into the contract, Circuit City sought to 
enjoin the action and to compel arbitration under the 
FAA (Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 110). The FAA was passed 
in 1925 to overcome judicial resistance to enforcement 
of arbitration agreements (Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 111). 
Adams in turn contended that his suit could go forward 
because his employment was subject to § 1 of the Act, 
which exempted from coverage “contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class 
42  Exploring this difference in the context of statutory interpretation, although not mentioning Justice Scalia by name.
43  Arguing that legislative history is not legitimate, Justice Scalia will, however, look to the writings of the framers as legitimate portrayals of the original meaning of 
constitutional text (Scalia, 1997, p. 38). Recall, by contrast, that Judge Easterbrook will look to legitimate legislative history to understand the meaning of statutory 
texts. It should be emphasized that Judge Easterbrook references legislative history to comprehend textual meaning, not purpose.
44  Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
45  Part of the signiﬁ cance of Justice Breyer’s attention to this case lies in his ascribing it sufﬁ cient importance even though he was not the author of any opinion in the 
case. He joined the dissents of Justice Stevens, Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and of Justice Souter, 532 U.S. at 133 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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46  See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115-16 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277, 1995).
47  While my emphasis is on the Court’s interpretation of the meaning as plain and therefore opaque, it also bears mentioning that its criteria focus on consistency in its 
own methods, which are a matter of its own rules of interpretation, rather than on the logic that led Congress to write the text it did.
48  Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” 
(9 U.S.C. § 1. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 112). Because, he 
claimed, his work for Circuit City was a matter of in-
terstate commerce, his employment contract was not 
covered by the FAA, and his suit could therefore proce-
ed (Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114). 
The Court split 5-4, with the majority holding 
that Adams’s contract was governed by the FAA and 
therefore subject to arbitration (Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 
119). I want to discuss two aspects of the case that di-
vided the Court. First, the majority held that § 1 of the 
FAA could not be understood literally to exclude “any 
[...] class of workers engaged in [...] interstate commer-
ce,” (9 U.S.C. § 1) because that broad exclusion in a resi-
dual phrase would swallow the more limited exclusions 
of “seamen” and “railroad employees” in the main part 
of the section, making those speciﬁ c exclusions redun-
dant (Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114). Instead, the Court 
held, the section should be read according to the sta-
tutory canon of ejusdem generis, where general words 
following an enumeration of more speciﬁ c words are 
understood to be conﬁ ned within the categories exem-
pliﬁ ed by the speciﬁ c terms (Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 114-
15). Under this construction, § 1 exempts from cove-
rage of the Act only those employees who work in the 
transportation industry (Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115). As 
students analyzing the case come to perceive, the analy-
sis is salutary, because it forces attention to the linguistic 
context of the words and shows that more may be at 
work in the structure of the text than ﬁ rst perceived. 
The majority’s analysis is also beneﬁ cial here because it 
acknowledges that invocation of statutory canons is not 
conclusive on its own and needs to be encompassed wi-
thin attention to “other sound considerations” relevant 
to interpretation of the disputed language (Circuit City, 
532 U.S. at 115). In the vocabulary we have been using, 
the canon cannot be invoked to claim that the text is 
simply “opaque”—that is, determinable independent of 
other context.
The majority’s second major point addressed the 
language of § 1 exempting coverage for those workers 
“engaged in [...] interstate commerce[,]” (9 U.S.C. § 1) 
assessing this language on its own, independent of the 
rest of the clause (Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 115). In ques-
tion here is whether, as Adams asserts, the language “in 
commerce” should be read as broadly as the language 
“involving commerce” in § 2 (9 U.S.C. § 2, 2006), which 
the Court had ruled in an earlier case to extend to the 
full reach of Congress’s commerce power.46 The Court 
majority rejected this analogy, holding that the language 
“in commerce” was a term of art having a more circu-
mscribed reach (Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 116). The Court 
also rejected Adams’s argument that when the FAA was 
passed in 1925 the term “in commerce” was not yet a 
term of art and was meant to include the full range of 
Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause (Circuit 
City, 532 U.S.  at 116). 
Under Adams’s theory, the application of the 
term “in commerce” should expand as the range of 
the Commerce power has also expanded. Because the 
Commerce power was understood to be narrow in 
1925 and applied basically to workers in transportation, 
the interpretation should not be so restricted in cur-
rent application when § 1 exempted workers “engaged 
in [...] interstate commerce.” The Court declined this 
argument, insisting that a “variable standard for inter-
preting common, jurisdictional phrases” would not only 
contradict earlier cases but “bring instability to statu-
tory interpretation” (Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 117). The 
Court insisted that its approach afforded “objective and 
consistent signiﬁ cance” to the meaning of the terms 
used by Congress and that it would be unwieldy for 
the Court to “deconstruct” statutory phrases involving 
the Commerce Clause depending upon the year of sta-
tutory enactment (Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 117-118). The 
words “engaged in commerce” had a “plain meaning” 
(Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 118).47 Consistent with Schauer, 
the Court treated the plain meaning as entrenched and 
refused to look separately to the meaning’s underlying 
justiﬁ cation (Schauer, 1991, p. 51). The plain meaning is 
opaque, requiring no regard for external context.
By contrast, the two dissents, by Justices Stevens 
and Souter, countered that the meaning of § 1 is, in my 
vocabulary, translucent and not opaque. Justice Stevens 
argues that the history of the FAA makes evident that 
its concern was to overcome judicial refusal to enforce 
commercial arbitration agreements—agreements betwe-
en businesses—not employment contracts—between 
management and labor.48 The concluding phrase of § 1, 
exempting “any [...] class of workers engaged in [...] in-
terstate commerce,” (9 U.S.C. § 1, 2006). was added to 
overcome the objections of organized labor, which wan-
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ted to ensure that no employees would be governed by 
the Act.49 According to this argument, then, the apparent 
linguistic logic of § 1, which would endorse reading it ac-
cording to the ejusdem generis canon, is undermined by 
the actual logic by which the clause was in fact written. 
The clause is not opaque but translucent; it does not 
stand on its own but requires context.
Justice Souter’s dissent emphasizes particularly 
interpretation of the “engaged in [...] commerce” lan-
guage of § 1. Justice Souter rejects the majority’s inter-
pretation of this phrase which, in his view, leaves the 
language “in a statutory ambit frozen in time” and ins-
tead argues that the language has an “elastic reach” that 
allows it to have a meaning “evolutionary” over time in 
contexts of new application and new understandings of 
the Commerce Clause power.50 I would go further and 
contend not simply that this evolutionary reading is a 
permitted interpretation of the statutory text, but that 
the broad language of the clause may indicate a congres-
sional purpose intending, like a common law statute, the 
meaning of the statute to change in new situations of 
application. The “semantic autonomy” (Ricoeur, 1991) of 
the text allows its recontextualization in new circums-
tances.51 Again meaning is translucent because it depen-
ds on context, here the context of application over time. 
Conclusion
Evaluation of a case such as Circuit City is insi-
ghtful, for it portrays how much may be at work in the 
text beyond an initial reading. More meaning may be 
disclosed in the text than may ﬁ rst appear. Concomitan-
tly, attention to the text without regard for its external 
context may distort its meaning. To comprehend a legal 
text by reference to its context is to appreciate the li-
ght that the context brings to the text and renders the 
thickness and color of the text no longer opaque but 
translucent.
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